

Fidelity (Canada) Asset Management ULC ("FCAM") Proxy Voting Guidelines

April 2018

I. General Principles and Application

- A. Voting shall be carried out by FCAM's proxy voting teams (or their designate) with non-routine proposals or other special circumstances also being evaluated by the appropriate FCAM analyst or portfolio manager. All votes are subject to the authority of the Chief Investment Officer of FCAM.
- B. FCAM will vote all equity securities where there is a regulatory obligation for us to do so or where the expected benefit of voting outweighs the expected costs.
- C. Except as set forth in these guidelines FCAM will usually vote in favour of incumbent directors and in favour of routine proposals.
- D. FCAM will vote to abstain on proposals if it is deemed to be in the best interest of investors or when the necessary information has not been provided. In certain limited circumstances FCAM may also vote to abstain in order to send a cautionary message to a company.
- E. In instances where there may be a conflict with FCAM's own interests we will either vote in accordance with the recommendation of our principal third party research provider, or if no recommendation is available, we will either not vote or abstain in accordance with local regulations.
- F. FCAM's proxy voting group will not vote at shareholder meetings of any FCAM sub-advised funds unless specifically instructed by a client.
- G. Voting decisions will be made on a case by case basis and will take account of the prevailing local market standards and best practice.

II. Shareholder Authority

- A. FCAM will vote against any limitation on shareholder rights or the transfer of authority from shareholders to directors. Likewise we will support proposals which enhance shareholder rights or maximise shareholder value.
- B. FCAM will vote against unusual or excessive authorities to increase issued share capital and particularly in respect of proposed increases for companies in jurisdictions without assured pre-emptive rights.
- C. FCAM is supportive of the principle of one share, one vote and will vote against the authorisation of stock with differential voting rights if the issuance of such stock would adversely affect the voting rights of existing shareholders.
- D. FCAM will generally vote against anti-takeover proposals including share authorities that can be used in such a manner.
- E. FCAM will generally support cumulative voting rights when it is determined they are favourable to the interest of minority shareholders.
- F. FCAM will support proposals to adopt mandatory voting by poll and full disclosure of voting outcomes.
- G. FCAM will support proposals to adopt confidential voting and independent vote tabulation practices.
- H. In general, FCAM will only support related party transactions which are made on terms equivalent to those that would prevail in an arm's length transaction.

III. Board Composition and Independence

- A. FCAM favours a separation of the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive and will vote in favour of this outcome when the opportunity arises.
- B. FCAM will consider voting against the election of directors if, in our view, they lack the necessary integrity, competence or capacity to carry out their duties as directors.
- C. FCAM favours robust independent representation on Boards and on occasion FCAM will consider voting against the election of nominees as independent directors if, in our view, they lack sufficient independence from the company, its management or its controlling shareholders.

IV. Remuneration

- A. FCAM will support proposals to give shareholders the right to vote on executive pay practices.
- B. FCAM will generally vote against remuneration proposals when payments made to executives are considered excessive or too short term in their orientation.
- C. FCAM strongly encourages the long term retention of shares. For shares awarded as part of a remuneration package we will have particular regard for minimum required retention periods. Practice in this regard differs around the world but over time we expect all companies to move towards a minimum guaranteed share retention period of at least five years from the date of grant.
- D. Remuneration proposals are evaluated on a case-by-case basis but in addition to the factors described above FCAM will generally vote against incentive arrangements if:
 - i. the dilutive effect of shares authorised under the plan is excessive; or
 - ii. material changes to arrangements are permissible without shareholder approval; or
 - iii. the potential awards are uncapped; or
 - iv. options are offered with an exercise price of less than 100% of fair market value at the date of grant or if re-pricing is subsequently permitted (employee sharesave schemes may be supported provided the offering price of shares is not less than 80% of the fair market value on the date of grant).
- E. In addition, subject to local market standards and best practice FCAM will generally vote against incentive arrangements if:
 - i. there are no performance conditions attached to any of the incentive awards; or
 - ii. there is no disclosure of the performance measures to be used; or
 - iii. the performance targets are insufficiently challenging; or
 - iv. performance retesting is permitted (if performance targets for a given year are not met then awards for that year should be foregone).
- F. FCAM will consider voting against the re-election of the Chairman of the Remuneration Committee if we vote against the Report of the Remuneration Committee for the second year in a row (assuming no change in personnel in the interim).
- G. FCAM does not support the presence of executive directors on the Remuneration Committee (or its equivalent) of the companies which employ them and we will vote against the remuneration report in these instances when given an opportunity to do so.

V. ESG

- A. FCAM will evaluate ESG proposals on a case-by-case basis considering whether the adoption of the proposal in question is likely to have a material impact on either investment risk or returns.